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Tech Road Map: IF-MAP Protocol: Page 2 of 2

In addition to running searches, IF-MAP clients can subscribe to data. When the IF-MAP server receives an update or addition to the server, it looks for outstanding subscriptions and sends responses.

The IF-MAP server is a repository; it doesn't correlate, validate, or weed out invalid data. The specification states that IF-MAP should augment other data sources and that it alone isn't a trusted source. The subtle point here is that the information contained in the IF-MAP server is only as valid as the data it's fed--if a device that publishes information to the server is compromised, then the IF-MAP server will retrieve incorrect data. The same could be said of any repository, of course. The goal is to ensure that reporting network and security devices, like switches or intrusion-detection systems, are sufficiently hardened against compromise.

Communication among IF-MAP clients and servers is secured using Transport Layer Security to mutually authenticate clients and servers using either static credentials or digital certificates. IF-MAP messages aren't intended to pass through multiple devices before reaching the IF-MAP server, and IT departments must be aware that an IF-MAP client that publishes state information could add, delete, or modify state data contained within the IF-MAP server, or an IF-MAP client that searches for device data could corrupt the IF-MAP server or read stored information.

At minimum, IF-MAP clients should be able to modify only their own data, and clients that retrieve data should be limited to read-only access and to only the information they need. When IF-MAP servers do come on the market, investigate included server access controls.