The Achilles Heel Of Next-Generation Satellites

By Christy hudgins-Bonafield  They've invested billions of dollars, and they've got a chronicle on latency, a narrative on jitter, a business case and a policy case. But what most providers of next-generation broadband satellites don't have is any kind of story when it comes to security. And before businesses invest more heavily in this broadcast-based, and therefore, more easily compromised medium, that narrative will have to be delivered. A survey of the leading broadband satellite companies shows that most are unwilling to discuss security, and the few that are less closemouthed present rudimentary information (see "The Sky's the Limit" on page 70). Loral Space and Communications' CyberStar plans to provide au thentication; Teledesic will provide link encryption and other options; Hughes Electronics' Spaceway "will contain mechanisms to support strong authentication and provide data privacy with support for key agreements and management," the provider says. Competition is one reason for secrecy, but the primary motivation probably has more to do with the fact that many next-generation satellite systems switch traffic between and among nations--and global security policy has all the continuity of a litter-strewn parking lot in the big city. The second major problem is that the bulk of these providers falls under U.S. restrictions on the export of strong encryption--whether that encryption is used to protect customer information or to secure network resources, such as satellite controls, billing or other vital information. And finally, businesses that need low latency alongside end-to-end encryption are apt to run into some significant technology hurdles with high-orbiting geostationary systems. The Missing Link While most businesses with sensitive traffic will want to secure their own satellite transmissions end-to-end, they also have an interest in their satellite providers deploying strong link encryption to prevent a satellite takeover and to protect the integrity of critical network information. But creating a system that scales and adheres to the law is difficult at best, impossible at worst. How do satellite providers--not to mention their intermediary terrestrial partners--meet the needs of multiple nations requiring key escrow or recovery? Then, what happens if one nation adamantly opposes its national traffic potentially being subjected to review by another nation? How do you scale a system like this? How do providers reassure customers when a single break-in to an escrowed system can compromise the entire network? There are no easy answers. Hans Werner-Braun, architectural consultant to Teledesic, speaks on his own behalf when he asks, "How much easier, cheaper, more competitive would it be if U.S. companies could pride themselves with implementing the best-possible security architectures, rather than shying away from it to avoid confrontations?" Instead, most broadband satellite players are still grappling with the issue. Some are hoping the mix of traffic and networking schemes will discourage intruders. Others, like Loral's CyberStar, are considering scrambling, similar to that already used for video broadcasts. But Jeff Schiller, IETF area director for security, warns that while scrambling may put off someone trying to regenerate a $20 film, it isn't apt to discourage those intent on bank fraud or industrial espionage. And with chips coming on the market for $2,000 or less that can decode 40-bit DES (Data Encryption Standard) at speeds close to real-time, most security experts remind us that weak encryption is inadequate for sensitive traffic. Another possibility, mentioned by Michael St. Johns, network architect with @Home Network, is for satellite companies to try to win permission to launch their satellites with strong encryption and then negotiate to whatever encryption level is mutually satisfactory to the nations involved. There are hints that some satellite providers may take such a tack. Similarly, encryption policies also are expected to be discussed as part of the nation-by-nation negotiations some providers are pursuing to secure spectrum and access to their services. But winning approval to launch with strong encryption isn't a given. The U.S. government, for example, at one point prevented Hughes from protecting the control information stream used for the Optus system it manufactured for an Australian group--primarily because the launch was to occur in China. While policies seem to have relaxed somewhat since then, questions remain.

Industry Briefs by Kelly Jackson Higgins